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NOTES AND COMMENTS 
Formulating Customary International Law: An 
Examination of the WHO International Code of 
Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As the network of transnational corporations (TNCs)l continues to extend over 
national boundaries, nations need new international agreements to govern the 
conduct of TNCs.2 Host countries3 often cannot adequately regulate TNCs as 
these nations frequently are unable to exert the same type of supervision and 
regulation over TNCs as over their domestic enterprises. 4 At the same time, 
national regulations that do exist severely overlap because home countries can 
1. For the purposes of this discussion, a TNC is: 
a business enterprise composed of a parent company and one or more subsidiaries implanted 
in two or more countries and organized for the conduct of profitable international production 
and provision of goods and services. It is characterized by its large size, ability to rapidly shift 
capital and resources, reliance on technological innovations which, in turn, often results in an 
oligopolistic control of markets, tightly-knit management group which is highly integrated and 
centralized, and international approach to business operations. 
Coonrod, The United Nations Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations, 18 HARv. INT'L L. J. 273, 
274-75 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Coonrod). Although authors have used a variety of terms to describe 
the transnational corporation (i.e., multinational corporation, multinational enterprise) the United 
Nations has consistently employed the term "transnational corporation" since 1974. Id. at 275 n.5. For a 
discussion of the debate surrounding the definition of the TNC, see Aharoni, On the Definition of the 
Multinational Corporation, 11 Q. REV. ECON. & Bus. 27 (1972); Hadari, The Structure of the Private 
Multinational Enterprise, 71 MICH. L. REv. 731 (1973). For a listing of various definitions that have been 
employed, see U.N. Department Economic and Social Affairs, Multinational Corporations in World 
Development, Annex II, at 118, U.N. Doc. ST/ECAll90 (1973). 
2. Coonrod, supra note I, at 274-76. 
3. The term "host country" refers to the nation in which subsidiaries or branches of the TNC are 
located. "Home country" refers to the state where the parent company is located. /d. at 276 n.15. 
4. For example, a nation may be able to assert jurisdiction over foreign TNCs making decisions 
regarding their subsidiaries within that nation's territory. However, the limits of enforcementjurisdic-
tion would restrict the host country's control. Id. at 276 & nn. 11-12 & 14. The regulation of TNCs by 
developing nations is even more difficult because of the "developing country's relatively weak position 
vis-a-vis the multinationals, the country's lack of information on the multinational's business activities 
outside the host country, and the country's initial lack of expertise in regulatory matters." Note, 
Influencing Multinational Corporations: The Infant Formula Marketing Controversy, 10 N. Y. u. J. INT'L L. & 
POL. 125, 163 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Infiuencing Multinational Corporations). A detailed discussion of 
the concerns facing a host country is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a thorough treatment of 
this topic, see generally Coonrod, supra note I, at 274-85. 
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control TNCs on matters which influence the host country and other nations.s In 
light of the inability of host countries to effectively control TNCs, nations have 
begun to use codes of conduct6 to harmonize and supplement existing national 
laws, to offer models for new legislation, and to promote an alternative method 
of regulating TNCs.7 
The major codes of conductS currently in existence or close to formal adoption 
are neither treaties nor multinational conventions.9 Instead, nations approve 
codes as "deciarations"lo or "recommendations"ll which are policy statements 
that are not legally binding.12 However, while the codes are not legally binding 
per se, their exact status in international law is unclear. 13 Codes of conduct can 
remain as non-binding recommendations, or according to one theory, codes of 
conduct can have great significance in international law,14 especially if nations 
comply with the code provisions in such a way as to create customary interna-
tionallaw. ls The Statute of the International Court of J usticel6 defines custom-
ary international law as "international custom, as evidence of general practice 
5. Coonrod, supra note I, at 276 & n.17, 277. See also Baade, The Legal Effects of Codes of Conduct for 
Multinational Enterprises, 22 GER. Y.B. INT'L L. 11, 12 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Baade]. 
6. In 1972 the U.N. established the Group of Eminent Persons to discuss the problems of transna-
tional corporations. ECOSOC Res. 1721,53 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No.1) at 4, U.N. Doc. E/5209 (1972). 
The Group defined a code of conduct as "a consistent set of recommendations which are gradually 
evolved and which may be revised as experience or circumstances require. Although they are not 
compulsory in character, they act as an instrument of moral persuasion, strengthened by the authority 
of international organizations and the support of public opinion." U.N. Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on International 
Relations 55 E/5500lRev. 21 ST/ESAl6, (1974) cited in R. WALDMANN, REGULATING INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS THROUGH CoDES OF CONDUCT 20 (1980) [hereinafter cited as WALDMANN]. 
7. WALDMANN, supra note 6, at 23-24. 
8. See OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL INVEST-
MENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (1976), reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 967, 969 (1976) 
[hereinafter cited as OECD DECLARATION]; ILO, TRIPARTITE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES CONCERNING 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL POLICY, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 423 (1978) [here-
inafter cited as TRIPARTITE DECLARATION]; UNCTAD, Report of the Intergovernmental Group of 
Experts on a Code of Conduct on Transfers of Technology, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.611 (1975), U.N. Cod. 
TD/B/600 (1976); Thirty-Fourth World Health Assembly, International Code of Marketing of 
Breastmilk Substitutes, Res. WHA34.22, Annex WHO Doc. A341VRlI5, (Fifteenth Plenary Meeting, 
May 21, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Code of Breastmilk Substitutes]. 
9. Baade, supra note 5, at 13-14. 
10. See OECD DECLARATION, supra note 8; TRIPARTITE DECLARATION, supra note 8. 
II. Code of Breastmilk Substitutes, supra note 8. 
12. Baade, supra note 5, at 13, 19. 
13. WALDMANN, supra note 6, at 20. 
14. Coonrod, supra note I, at 297. 
15. Baade, supra note 5, at 15; Davidow & Chiles, The United States and the Issue of the Binding or 
Voluntary Nature of International Codes of Conduct Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 
247,255 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Davidow & Chiles]. 
16. The International Court of Justice is the judicial body of the United Nations. The Court has 
jurisdiction to give advisory opinions on matters of law and treaty construction and it has the power to 
settle legal disputes between nations when voluntarily submitted to it. See Stat. I.C.]. arts. 34-36. 
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accepted as law."17 Thus, while the codes themselves are not "instant interna-
tional law,"18 but rather pronouncements of policy, an application of policy 
through state action l9 and an acceptance of the practice as required by law may 
lead to the creation of customary international law.20 
This Comment focuses on the legal effects of a code of conduct for TNCs 
through an examination of the World Health Organization (WHO) "Interna-
tional Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes" (Code of Breastmilk Substi-
tutes). After reviewing the WHO authority to formulate a code of conduct, the 
author analyzes the provisions of the Code of Breastmilk Substitutes and discuss-
es the current legal effects of this Code. The author then examines the process 
required to form customary international law and suggests how this Code may 
become international law. 
II. THE FORMULA MARKETING CONTROVERSY 
On May 21,1981, the World Health Assembly (WHA)21 passed the "Interna-
tional Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes."22 This Code is a response 
by a U.N. organization to the international baby formula controversy.23 Previous 
17. Stat. I.C.]. art. 38(1)(b). 
18. Baade, supra note 5, at 22. Codes are not "instant" international law in that codes are not 
international law upon passage. The author uses the word "instant" to contrast with the long, evolving 
process of law formation as in customary international law, which is the subject of this Comment. 
19. State actions includes physical acts and possibly statements and declarations by a state from which 
other nations can infer the state's views on international law . Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International 
Law, 47 BRIT.]. INT'L L. 1, 10 (1974-75) [hereinafter cited as Akehurst]. For a detailed discussion of the 
meaning of state action, see § V.B.1 infra. 
20. Davidow & Chiles, supra note 15, at 255. 
21. The WHA is "the highest governing body of the [World Health] [O]rganization." Marketing and 
Promotion of Infant Formula in Developing Nations, 1978: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and Scientific 
Research of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 104 (1978) (statement of Dr. 
Manuel Carballo, M.D., Maternal and Child Health Division, WHO) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Hearing]. 
"Member States of the World Health Organization through its governing bodies, which are the World 
Health Assembly, the Executive Board and the Regional Committees, determine health policies and 
doctrines in international health work." /d. at 103-04. 
Id. 
The World Health Organization is one of the specialized agencies of the United Nations 
system. It is composed of its 151 Member States. Its objective is the attainment by all peoples of 
the highest possible level of health. The World Health Organization is the UN agency respon-
sible for planning and coordinating health activities on a global basis, promoting technical 
cooperation with and among its Member States, and the exchange of scientific information. At 
the request of Member States it assists in planning and coordinating health programmes, 
strengthening health services and training health workers. It promotes medical and health-
related research, develops health regulations, undertakes surveillance of communicable dis-
eases, collects and disseminates data on health and health-related issues, sets standards for the 
quality control of drugs, vaccines, and other substances relating to health. The position of the 
World Health Organization on the question of infant feeding has been, and continues to be, 
that breast feeding is ideally suited to the overall health and well-being of the young infant, and 
that breast milk is the food of choice during early infancy. 
22. Code of Breastmilk Substitutes, supra note 8. 
23. Helpful to an understanding of the infant formula controversy is an examination of the role of 
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efforts by private groups,24 industry,25 and individual nations26 to deal with the 
international formula producers in encouraging the use of breastmilk substitutes. One source estimated 
that formula sales rose to more than $2 billion in 1980, including more than 50% of the sales in 
developing nations. Post & Baer, The International Code of Marlwtingfor Breastmiik Substitutes: Consensus, 
Compromise and Conflict in the Infant Formula Controversy, REV. INT'L COMM'N JURISTS, 52, 54 (1980) 
[hereinafter cited as Post & Baer]. Nestle, a Swiss based corporation, dominates the Third World market 
with a 50% share. The three American producers - Ross, Mead Johnson and Wyeth Laboratories-
account for 15% of the market in developing nations. Industry spokesmen estimate that sales are 
growing at the rate of 20% per year in the United States and 12% abroad. N.Y. Times, May 22, 1981, 
§ IV, at 1, col. 3. While infant formula corporations are enthusiastic about this growth, others are 
concerned by the coinciding decrease in breast feeding. Note, Innocents Abroad: Infant Food Technology at 
the Law's Frontier, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 617,623 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Innocents Abroad]. 
General agreement on the superiority of breastmilk over formula exists. Representatives of industry 
do not deny that "breast feeding is best" and agree that breastfeeding should be actively protected and 
encouraged. Marlwting and Promotion of Infant Formula and Trade in Developing Countries: Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 
2d Sess. 26 (1980) (statement of David Cox, President, Ross Laboratories) [hereinafter cited as 1980 
Hearings]; Id. at 22 (statement of Gary W. Mize, Vice President, Mead Johnson). Most authorities claim 
that breastmilk provides better nutrition than does any substitute.bifluencing Multinational Corporations, 
supra note 4, at 128-29. However, bottlefeeding is adequate and acceptable if prepared under sanitary 
conditions and administered in sufficient quantity. 1980 Hearings, supra, at 103 (excerpt from Back-
ground Paper for Meeting on Infant and Young Child Feeding, prepared by WHO and UNICEF). 
Proper use of infant formula requires sanitary conditions, clean water and sufficient income to pay 
for an adequate amount of formula. In many developing nations, these requirements are difficult for 
inhabitants to satisfy. As Senator Edward Kennedy (D. Mass.) rhetorically asked: "Can a product that 
requires clean water, good sanitation, adequate family income and a literate parent to follow printed 
instructions be properly and safely used in areas where water is contaminated, sewage runs in the 
streets, poverty is severe and illiteracy is high?" A U.S. Vote on Baby Formula that Stirred a Storm, U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REp., June I, 1981, at 60-61. In some nations, infant formula products cost $100 per infant 
during the first six month period of use. Such an expenditure may exceed 50% of the household 
income. Post & Baer, supra, at 53. In view of these factors, formula misuse is common in developing 
nations. "Some 10 million infants and young children annually suffer from malnutrition and diarrhea 
associated with inadequate breastfeeding and the use of artificial feeding." 127 CONGo REC. E2405 (daily 
ed. May 19, 1981) (Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Health). 
Many factors contribute to the shift away from breast feeding, including urbanization, female 
employment and a desire to emulate the West. Recently many government officials and private groups 
have criticized the marketing techniques of the infant formula producers, claiming that the producers 
idealize bottlefeeding and discourage women from breastfeeding. See Influencing Multinational Corpora-
tions, supra note 4, at 130-31. Companies use direct radio and billboard advertisements and give free 
promotional materials, such as calendars and totes, to new mothers. "Milk nurses," women employed by 
the companies and dressed as health workers, give health and nutritional advice to women in maternity 
hospitals. Companies have also organized the "indiscriminate" distribution of free formula and bottle 
samples in hospitals and clinics. Id. One baby book, distributed by Wyeth, claimed that their formula 
S-26 "nourishes babies like mother's milk." 1980 Hearings, supra, at 55 (joint prepared statement of Leah 
Margulies, Director, Infant Formula Program, Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, and 
Douglas Johnson, Chairperson, Infant Formula Action Coalition). Critics of these marketing practices 
claim that they contribute to the use of formula. These critics also fear that the marketing techniques 
are especially effective in the unsophisticated markets of developing nations. Manufacturers deny these 
charges and claim that they abide by a voluntary code of self-restraint. "But a report by health 
professionals, Peace Corps workers and others in the field last year found at least 700 individual 
instances of abuse." 127 CONGo REC. S5313 (daily ed. May 20, 1981) (remarks of Sen. Mitchell). 
24. Within the United States, shareholders have used proxy solicitations successfully to present their 
views on specific corporate policies regarding the marketing of infant formulas. See Influencing Multina-
tional Corporations, supra note 4, at 142-52. 
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baby formula problem left many of these groups believing that only a coordi-
nated international plan could achieve an effective solution. 27 Therefore, the 
WHO and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UN-
The first major international discussions regarding the marketing practices of the infant formula 
industry involved "a series of pediatrician/infant food industry seminars sponsored by the United 
Nations Protein Advisory Group (PAG), UNICEF, the International Pediatric Association, and the 
World Health Organization in Bogata (1970), Paris (1972), New York (1973), and Singapore (1974)." Id. 
at 137. UNICEF is "an agency, created by the United Nations General Assembly in 1946, concerned 
with improving the health and nutrition of children and mothers throughout the world." RANDOM 
HOUSE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1552 (1st ed. 1967). No more meetings took place after 1974 
due to the lack of both an enforcement mechanism and agreement on the type or effectiveness of 
industry self-regulation. Nevertheless, in 1974 the WHA adopted a resolution which identified mislead-
ing sales promotion as a cause of declining breastfeeding and urged nations to take action to review and 
regulate market practices. In 1975, the International Pediatric Association passed a resolution calling 
for controls on the promotional activities of manufacturers. Post & Baer, supra note 23, at 56. Public 
pressure against the industry resulted in the joint WHO-UNICEF meeting in 1979. See note 29 and 
accompanying text infra. 
25. Following the Singapore Conference of 1974, industry representatives met to organize the 
International Council of Infant Food Industries (ICIFI), a self-regulatory council. Industry members' 
accounting for approximately 80% of world sales joined this group. Post & Baer, supra note 23, at 55. 
The ICIFI formulated a voluntary Code of Ethics and Professional Standards for Advertising, Product 
Information and Advisory Services for Breast-Milk Substitutes. While critics of the infant formula 
industry first saw this Code as a positive step, the weaknesses of the provisions soon became obvious. For 
a detailed analysis of this Code, see Innocents Ailroad, supra note 23, at 630. Many companies formulated 
individual codes, such as the Nestle Infant Food Policy. The codes of Abbott and Bristol-Meyers 
contained more explicit, stringent directives than did the ICIFI Code. Influencing Multinational Corpora-
tions, supra note 4, at 139. 
26. Several governments have taken steps to regulate the marketing of infant formula products 
within their borders. In Papua New Guinea, formula as well as bottles, nipples (teats) and pacifiers can 
only be obtained by prescription. The law forbids formula advertisements but encourages breastmilk 
advertisements. 127 CONGo REC. E2335 (daily ed. May 13, 1981) (statement by Rep. Schroeder introduc-
ing into the Record an article by Patricia Jelliffe, entitled When the Answer is not a Bottle). In Nigeria and 
Jamaica strict controls on the promotion of canned baby milk exist as law. Influencing Multinational 
Corporations, supra note 4, at 163. In Zambia only the nationalized powdered milk is available and the 
labels encourage a mother to "BREAST FEED YOUR CHILD." Id. (emphasis in original). The 
Philippines controls infant formula marketing by the provisions of an act similar to the U.S. Food, Drug 
and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1976 & Supp. II 1978); Innocents Ailroad, supra note 23, at 
638-39. 
Rep. Michael Harrington (D. Mass.) who introduced an "Infant Feeding Resolution" led a U.S. 
Congressional movement to limit the promotion of infant formula in developing nations. H.R.J. Res. 
1095, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONGo REC. 30,175 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Harrington). This 
resolution called on the President to sponsor a study of worldwide formula use, its health effects, the 
effects of advertising, the extent of U.S. government promotion of breastmilk substitutes in developing 
nations, and the possible use of bribes to insure formula sales. Id. Following this, in 1977 Congressman 
Harrington introduced an amendment to the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 
1977 which codified the policies presented in the 1976 joint resolution. 22 U.S.C. § 2151(0) (Supp. I 
1979). The Congressional conference committee to which the bill was referred agreed that businesses in 
the infant formula industry have the responsibility not to jeopardize the health of children. However, 
the committee's redraft - which Congress enacted - merely encourages the President to respond to 
these issues. As a result of the modified provisions of the Act, it gained little notice. Innocents Ailroad, 
supra note 23, at 641. For a detailed discussion of congressional activity, see id. at 639-46. 
27. Innocents Ailroad, supra note 23, at 627-28. 
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ICEF)28 sponsored a joint meeting in Geneva in October 1979,29 to discuss the 
role of breastfeeding and the appropriate marketing of breastmilk substitutes. 
The Thirty-Third World Health Assembly30 endorsed the recommendations 
resulting from this meeting and instructed the Director-General of the WHO to 
draft an international code.3! As a result of meetings with representatives of 
governments, industry, the scientific community, and international organiza-
tions,32 the Director-General produced several code drafts. The Thirty-Fourth 
WHA adopted the final Code with 118 nations voting in favor of the Code.33 
Only the United States voted against the resolution.34 
28. For a description of UNICEF, see note 24 supra. 
29. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, JOINT WHO/UNICEF MEETING ON INFANT AND YOUNG CHILD 
FEEDING: STATEMENT, RECOMMENDATIONS, LIST OF PARTICIPANTS (1979), cited in Innocents Abroad, supra 
note 23, at 637. 
Since WHO had a definite interest in the regulation of marketing of breastmilk substitutes, the 
Director-General organized the October 1979 meeting. The invited participants at this meeting were: 
government representatives from eighteen countries including India, Japan, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, the U.S. and Britain. Also among the partici-
pants were experts from U.N. and other agencies such as the Food & Agriculture Organisation 
(FAO), the World Bank's Rural Development Department, the International Labour Organi-
sation (ILO), the U.N. Conference on Trade & Development (UNCTAD), the U.N. FUND for 
Population Activities (UNFPA), the World Food Programme and the U.N. Industrial Devel-
opment Organisation (UNIDO). Among the participants from the infant-formula industry 
itself were executives from Bristol-Myers, Mead Johnson, Abbott, Wyeth and Gerber (U.S.), 
Friesland and Nutricia (Holland), Dumex (Denmark), Meiji Milk Products and Snow Brand 
Oapan) and Nestle (Switzerland). 
127 CoNG. REc. S6487 (daily ed. June 18, 1981) (statement by Sen. Leahy introducing into the Record 
an article from ASIA WEEK, entitled Sabotage: Breast vs. Bottle: A New Battlefront). 
30. The Thirty-Third World Health Assembly was held in Geneva during May 1980. See Innocents 
Abroad, supra note 23, at 632 n.89. 
31. In 1980, the Thirty-Third World Health Assembly, in resolution 33.32, requested the Director-
General inter alia to 
"prepare an international code of marketing of breastmilk substitutes" and to "submit the code 
to the Executive Board for consideration at its sixty-seventh session and for forwarding with its 
recommendations to the Thirty-fourth World Health Assembly, together with proposals re-
garding its promotion and implementation, either as a regulation in the sense of Articles 21 
and 22 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization or as a recommendation in the 
sense of Article 23, outlining the legal and other implications of each choice." 
Thirty-Fourth World Health Assembly, Draft International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substi-
tutes, Report by the Director-General, WHO Doc. A34/8 (67th Session of Executive Board, December 
10, 1980). 
32. Id. See 1980 Hearings, supra note 23, at 53. 
33. World Health Assembly, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Fifteenth Plenary Meeting 9, WHO 
Doc. A34IVRi15 (prov. ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Fifteenth Plenary Meeting]. 
34. In light of the idea of a WHO code for regulating the infant formula, industry practices 
originating in the United States are ironic. Senator Kennedy requested that the Director-General of the 
WHO take action following the U.S. Senate hearings on the subject. J. of Commerce, May 7, 1981, at 4, 
col. I. See generally 1978 Hearing, supra note 21. 
The U.S. government affirmed that it strongly supported efforts to promote and protect breastfeed-
ing and remained "committed to improving infant and child health around the world." Thirty-Fourth 
World Health Assembly, Committee A, Provisional Summary Record of the Fourteenth Meeting 9, 
WHO Doc. A341A1SRi14 (prov. ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Fourteenth Meeting]. In spite of this 
commitment, the United States maintained that it could not support the Code. In voting against the 
Code, Gerald Helman, U.S. Ambassador to the WHO, claimed that the Code would cause serious legal 
and constitutional problems for the United States. The central basis for opposition to the Code results 
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III. THE INTERNATIONAL CODE OF MARKETING OF BREASTMILK SUBSTITUTES 
A. Authority to Formulate a Code 
The aim of the Code of Breastmilk Substitutes is to contribute to the safe and 
adeq uate nutrition of infants "by the protection and promotion of breast feeding, 
and by ensuring the proper use of breast milk substitutes, when these are neces-
sary, on the basis of adequate information and through appropriate marketing 
and distribution."35 In order to accomplish this purpose, the Code provides a 
specific set of directives for the infant formula industry regarding the marketing 
of breastmilk substitutes.36 In addition, the Code provides guidelines for indi-
vid ual governments encouraging the promotion of breastfeeding.37 The author-
ity to formulate such a code comes from the WHO Constitution.3s As stated in 
Article I of its Constitution, the objective of the WHO "shall be the attainment by 
all peoples of the highest possible level of health."39 
The WHO and the WHA have broad powers with which to attain their health 
objectives. Some of the functions of the WHO include: 
(k) to propose conventions, agreements and regulations, and make 
recommendations with respect to international health matters and to 
perform such duties as may be assigned thereby to the Organization 
and are consistent with its objectives;40 
(I) to promote maternal and child health and to foster the ability to 
live harmoniously in a changing total environment;41 [and] 
(v) generally to take all necessary action to attain the objective of the 
Organization .42 
The WHA also has the power under Article 18 "to take any other appropriate 
action to further the objective of the Organization."43 In addition, the constitu-
tion specifically authorizes the WHA to adopt conventions and regulations44 and 
from WHO's involvement in a commercial code, especially one with the "overall effect of prescribing a 
rigid set of rules applicable to companies, health workers, and health care systems in all parts of the 
world." Id. 
35. Code of Breastmilk Substitutes, supra note 8, art. 1. 
36. See id. arts. 4-11. 
37. Id. 
38. "The [WHO] Constitution was adopted by the International Health Conference held in New 
York from 19 June to 22 July, 1946, and signed on 22 July 1946 by the representatives of 61 States." 
CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, in BASIC DOCUMENTS I n.1 (1978) [hereinafter 
cited as CONSTITUTION]' 
39. Id. art. 1. 
40. Id. art. 2(k), at 2-3. 
41. Id. art. 2(1). 
42. Id. art. 2(v). 
43. !d. art. 18(m). 
44. Id. art. 21. 
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to make recommendations. 45 The WHA adopted the Code of Breastmilk Substi-
tutes pursuant to Article 23 which authorizes the WHA to make recommenda-
tions "to Members with respect to any matter within the competence of the 
Organization."46 
B. Code Provisions 
Before considering the legal effects of the Code of Breastmilk Substitutes, an 
understanding of the scope of the Code provisions is necessary. The Code of 
Breastmilk Substitutes applies to the marketing of breast milk substitutes, feeding 
bottles and nipples, and to the availability of information concerning the use of 
these productsY 
The Code suggests that producers of breast milk substitutes should not engage 
in direct advertising or other promotions to the general public regarding 
breastmilk substitutes. 48 Specifically, the Code provides that manufacturers and 
distributors should neither give free samples to the general public49 nor provide 
for "special displays, discount coupons, premiums, special sales, loss-leaders,50 
and tie-in-sales51 for products within the scope of the Code."52 Under the Code, 
marketing personnel may receive sales bonuses, but corporations may not in-
clude the volume of sales of breast milk substitutes when calculating bonuses.53 
Company marketing personnel should restrict their personal contact with preg-
nant women or mothers of young children to prevent "educational" programs 
aimed at pregnant women.54 According to the Code provisions, formula com-
panies should limit the information they provide to health professionals to 
"scientific and factual matters."55 Manufacturers and distributors should not give 
45. [d. art. 23. 
46. [d. 
47. Specifically, the Code applies to the following products: 
breastmilk substitutes, including infant formula; other milk products, foods and beverages, 
including bottle-fed complementary foods when marketed or otherwise represented to be 
suitable, with or without modification, for use as a partial or total replacement of breastmilk; 
feeding bottles and teats. It also applies to their quality and availability and to information 
concerning their use. 
Code of Breastmilk Substitutes, supra note 8, art. 2. 
48. [d. art. 5.1. 
49. [d. art. 5.2. 
50. The Code does not define the terms generally used in commercial circles. A loss leader is an 
"[iJtem sold by a merchant at a very low price and sometimes below cost in order to attract people to [aJ 
store with the hope that they will buy additional items on which a profit will be made." BLACK'S LAw 
DICTIONARY 852 (5th ed. 1979). 
51. A tie-in-sale is "allowed by a seller only on condition of attendant purchase of another product or 
fulfillment of an attendant agreement." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2391 (3rd ed. 1976). 
52. Code of Breastmilk Substitutes, supra note 8, art. 5.3. 
53. [d. art. 8.1. 
54. [d. art. 8.2. 
55. [d. art. 7.2. 
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inducements to health workers56 to promote the products. 57 While formula 
companies may give health workers free samples to be used for research pur-
poses, they may not give samples to pregnant women or families of young 
children.58 
A central theme of the Code is that information on infant feeding should 
stress the superiority of breast feeding over bottle feeding. 59 Labels on breastmilk 
substitutes should "provide the necessary information about the appropriate use 
of the product ... so as not to discourage breastfeeding."60 The information on 
the label should not idealize the use of formula and advertisers may not use 
pictures of infants on the label.61 The product itself should meet the quality 
standards of the Codex Alimentarius Commission62 and manufacturers should 
list all ingredients on the label.63 
In addition to providing directives for private industry,64 the Code calls for 
government action to achieve the objectives of the Code: "Governments should 
take action to give effect to the principles and aim ofthis Code, as appropriate to 
their social and legislative framework, including the adoption of nationallegisla-
tion, regulations or other suitable measures."65 For example, the Code urges 
56. The Code defines a "health worker" as "a person working in a component of such a health care 
system, whether professional or non-professional, including voluntary, unpaid workers." [d. art. 3. 
57. [d. art. 7.3. 
58. [d. art. 7.4. 
59. [d. art. 1. 
60. [d. art. 9.1. 
61. !d. art. 9.2. 
62. [d. art. 10.2. 
The purpose of the work of the Codex Alimentarious Commission [a sub-group of the WHO] . 
. . is to protect consumers against health hazards in food and against fraud, to ensure fair 
practices in the food trade, and to facilitate international trade in foods. The eleventh session 
of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, held in April 1976, adopted 21 international food 
standards, including standards for infant formulas, canned baby foods, cereal-based foods for 
infants and children .... 
BIENNIAL REpORT OF THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL TO THE WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY AND TO THE UNITED 
NATIONS, THE WORK OF THE WHO 1976-1977 § 11.57 (1978). 
63. Code of Breastmilk Substitutes, supra note 8, art. 9.4. 
64. Since international law is formed only by state actors, it can only apply directly to state actors. 
Baade, supra note 5, at 16. However, "[t]he present century has seen a growing tendency to admit that 
individuals - and companies - have some degree of international personality, but the whole subject is 
extremely controversial." M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 94 (1970). 
Although TNCs are non-state actors, the Code can set forth guidelines directly for industry because the 
Code recommends rather than requires actions by TNCs. The Code does not become international law 
upon passage and no mechanics of enforcement which apply to either states or TNCs exist. Thirty-
Fourth World Health Assembly, Draft International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes, 
Report by the Director-General 4, Annex, WHO Doc. A34/8, EB67/20 (67th Session of the Executive 
Board, December 10, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Draft International Code] (This document includes an 
explanatory section written by the Director-General followed by two draft codes.). However, nations can 
adopt these guidelines in national legislation and thus, the Code can indirectly govern the behavior of 
TNCs. 
65. Code of Breastmilk Substitutes, supra note 8, art. 11.1. 
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governments to take more responsibility for providing information about infant 
and young child feeding;66 in particular, member states should encourage 
breastfeeding and emphasize its superiority.67 According to the Code, manufac-
turers and distributors should use neither health care systems68 nor displays for 
breastmilk substitutes to promote formulas. 69 
Finally, governments have the responsibility of monitoring the application of 
the Code. 70 The Code also calls upon non-governmental organizations, man-
ufacturers, professional groups and consumer organizations to work with gov-
ernments in this implementation and monitoring. 71 Member states are responsi-
ble for reporting to the Director-General of the WHO on the "action taken to 
give effect to the principles and aim of the Code."72 The Director-General will 
make his first report to the WHA on the implementation of this Code in 1983.73 
The Code is not legally binding but it has political and moral force; 74 this 
particular provision probably permits member states to bring political and moral 
pressure against each other in order to give effect to the Code. 
C. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Code 
The Code of Breastmilk Substitutes represents an unprecedented step by any 
U.N. agency to deal with a public health problem through the control of the 
marketing practices of private industry.75 In the past, the WHO has never 
become involved directly with the activity of TNCs.76 However, in the present 
case, the WHO is attempting to correct a public health problem by controlling 
the behavior of TNCs. Unlike other codes designed to influence the behavior of 
TNCs generally,77 this Code only applies to a single industry78 and a single 
theme unifies the Code: the superiority of breastmilk over any substitutes. 
Because of its single industry application and unified theme, the Code can 
outline specific guidelines. 79 Thus, the Code provides private industry with a 
66. /d. art. 4.1. 
67. [d. art. 4.2. 
68. [d. art. 6.2. 
69. [d. art. 6.3. 
70. [d. art. 11.2. 
71. [d. art. 11.4. 
72 . [d. art. 11.6. 
73. [d. art. 11.7. 
74. See text accompanying note 107 infra regarding the political and moral force of a code. 
75. Post & Baer, supra note 23, at 60. 
76. See id. 
77. See OECD DECLARATION, supra note 8; TRIPARTITE DECLARATION, supra note 8. 
78. See Code of Breastmilk Substitutes, supra note 8, art. 2. 
79. Compare the general language of OECD DECLARATION, supra note 8, with the detailed recommen-
dations of the Code of Breastmilk Substitutes, supra note 8, arts. 4-11. 
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clear directive for corporate action and offers governments a detailed model for 
national legislation and action.80 
While some proponents of the Code regard the Code's establishment of clear 
guidelines in support of breastfeeding as its chief strength,8l formula industry 
officials criticize the Code's specificity. For example, industry officials argue that 
nations should give health professionals more discretion over promotion of 
breast milk substitutes by refusing to limit promotion by these individuals to 
"scientific and factual matters."82 As previously noted, the Code does not permit 
health professionals to "give samples of infant formula to pregnant women, 
mothers of infants and young children, or members of their families."83 Since 
physicians are included within the definition of "health professional," even they 
should not provide free samples of infant formula to their patients. 84 
American critics contend that the Code is so restrictive that it undermines free 
speech, free press and competition.85 One American politician also criticized the 
Code's specificity, saying that the Code "regulates with complete, drastic, and 
totalitarian precision every aspect of marketing, distributing, and using infant 
products ... and defines with equal precision every permissible activity of every 
person involved in any way in such transactions."86 Critics not only regard the 
Code as a "totalitarian document" in itself, but also fear that it is "a dangerous 
80. See Code of Breastmilk Substitutes, supra note 8, arts. 4-11. 
81. 127 CoNG. REc. S5312 (daily ed. May 20, 1981) (statement by Sen. Leahy introducing into the 
Record an article by Richard Harley, entided Bottle-Feeding, Good or Bad' UN Agency Takes Critical Vote); 
127 CONGo REC. H2950-51 (daily ed. June 16, 1981) (remarks of Rep. Bedell). 
82. 1980 Hearings, supra note 23, at 37 (statement of David Cox, President, Ross Laboratories); Code 
of Breastmilk Substitutes, supra note 8, art. 7.2. 
83. Code of Breastmilk Substitutes, supra note 8, art. 7.4. 
84. See ill. arts. 3, 7.4. 
85. 127 CONGo REc. E2367 (daily ed. May 14, 1981) (statement by Rep. Michel introducing into the 
Record an article by Sam J. Ervin, Jr., entided A Totalitarian Grab for Baby's Bottle); 127 CONGo REC. 
H2946 (daily ed.June 16,1981) (remarks of Rep. Lagomarsino); 127 CONGo REc. H2950 (daily ed.June 
16, 1981) (statement by Rep. McClory introducing into the Record an editorial from the Chicago-
Tribune, entided Th£ Politics of Breast-Feeding). 
86. 127 CONGo REc. E2367 (daily ed. May 14, 1981) (statement by Rep. Michel introducing into the 
Record an article by Sam J. Ervin, Jr., entitled A Totalitarian Grab for Baby's Bottle). See Implementation of 
the World Health Organization (WHO) Code of Infant Formula Marketing Practices: Hearings before the 
Subcomm. on International Economics Policy and Trade and on Human Rights and International OrganiUltions of 
the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1981) (statement of John R. Bolton, General 
Counsel, Agency for International Development) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Hearings]. Regarding the 
Code, Mr. Bolton stated: 
I don't know of any other international agreement into which the United States has entered 
that contains proscriptions as sweeping as this one in the area of the first amendment .... The 
focus of my concern is article 5 of the code as drafted that contains a complete prohibition on 
advertising. 
Id. at 18. For a detailed critique of the specific Code provisions, see 1981 Hearings, supra, at 129-42 
(statement of George Graham, Division of Human Nutrition, Department of International Health, 
School of Hygiene and Public Health, John Hopkins University). 
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precedent of worldwide control over the advertising, labeling, and marketing of 
infant products."87 U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services Richard 
Schweiker explained that "[t]he administration [of President Ronald Reagan] 
honestly does not believe the WHO should be an international Federal Trade 
Commission."88 Reagan officials contend that the WHO should not involve itself 
in commercial regulation and the WHO should refrain from telling private 
industry how to conduct business, especially since the WHO is a health organiza-
tion.89 
IV. THE LEGAL EFFECT OF THE CODE OF BREASTMILK SUBSTITUTES 
A. Legal Background of the Code of Breastmilk Substitutes 
During the process of developing an international code of marketing of 
breastmilk substitutes, the Director-General of the WHO formulated several 
draft codes.90 Under the provisions of the WHO Constitution, a draft code can 
be approved as a convention,9) a regulation92 or a recommendation.93 Since the 
formality of a convention is time-consuming and inflexible,94 the Director-Gen-
eral focused on the latter two options.95 A major source of controversy among 
member states in the code development process was the debate over the legal 
status of the Code.96 One important focus of this controversy was the legal 
distinction between a regulation and a recommendation and the legal implica-
tions of each.97 
87. 127 CONGo REc. E2367 (daily ed. May 14, 1981) (statement by Rep. Michel introducing into the 
Record an article by Sam]. Ervin, Jr., entitled A Totalitarian Grab fqr Baby's Bottle). See also notes 34 & 85 
and accompanying text supra. 
88. A U.S. Vote on Baby Formula that Stirred a Storm, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REp., June I, 1981, at 60. 
89. Id. While the Reagan administration has spoken out against the Code, members of Congress have 
rallied to the Code's support. The House passed a joint resolution supporting the "implementation of 
the World Health Organization voluntary code on infant formula" by a vote of 301 to 100. H.R.]. Res. 
287, 97th Cong., lst Sess., 127 CONGo REC. H2944 (daily ed.June 16, 1981) (statement of Rep. Zablocki). 
90. See Draft International Code, supra note 64, at 1. This document contains one draft code in the 
form of a recommendation and one draft in the form of a regulation. 
91. CONSTITUTION, supra note 38, art. 19. 
92. Id. art. 21. 
93. Id. art. 23. 
94 Baade, supra note 5, at 13. 
95. Post & Baer,supra note 23, at 57-58. In fact the Thirty-Third World Health Assembly requested 
the Director-General to draft codes in the form of a recommendation or a regulation. See note 31 and 
accompanying text supra. 
96. Post & Baer, supra note 23, at 57. For a discussion of the U.S. position, see Fourteenth Meeting, 
supra note 34, at 9 (statement of Gerald Helman, U.S. Ambassador to the WHO); U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP.,June 1, 1981, at 60-61; 127 CONGo REc. H2952 (dailyed.June 16, 1981) (copy of State Department 
telegram). 
97. See Draft International Code, supra note 64, at 3-4. 
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B. Legal Implications of a Regulation 
One of the draft codes prepared by the Director-General was in the form of a 
regulation.98 Article 21 of the Constitution of the WHO confers authority to 
adopt regulations.99 Article 22 outlines the procedure by which member nations 
adopt regulations. loo According to the WHO interpretation, any code in the 
form of a regulation adopted pursuant to Article 22 would have a "binding effect 
without the need for ratification, acceptance or approval by each member."IOI 
Regulations come into force for all members after the Health Assembly gives due 
notice of their adoption. lo2 However, the WHA cannot require compliance from 
members who notify the Director-General of rejection or reservations within the 
period stated in the notice. lo3 To implement the regulation, each member state 
bound by the regulation would be free to determine the legal process by which 
the state would give effect to the regulation. lo4 By simply requiring that states 
give "effect" to the regulation and by granting nations discretion as to the 
method of implementation, the WHA does not seem to require a word for word 
adoption of the regulation within the member states. 
98. [d. at 5. 
99. Anicle 21 of the WHO Constitution provides: 
The Health Assembly shall have authority to adopt regulations concerning: 
(a) sanitary and quarantine requirements and other procedures designed to prevent the 
international spread of disease; 
(b) nomenclatures with respect to disease, causes of death and public health practices; 
(c) standards with respect to diagnostic procedures for international use; 
(d) standards with respect to the safety, purity and potency of biological, phannaceutical and 
similar products moving in international commerce; 
(e) advertising and labelling of biological, phannaceutical and similar products moving in 
international commerce. 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 38, an. 21. 
100. Anicle 22 of the WHO Constitution provides: "Regulations adopted pursuant to Article 21 shall 
come into force for all Members after due notice has been given of their adoption by the Health 
Assembly except for such Members as may notify the Director-General of rejection or reservation 
within the period stated in the notice." CoNSTITUTION, supra note 38, an. 22. 
101. Draft International Code, supra note 64, at 3. 
102. See CONSTITUTION, supra note 38, art. 22. 
103. [d. "The WHO Survey of the First Ten Years ... defined the Regulations as constituting 'a new 
depanure in International Law by laying obligations on States without signature and ratification of a 
fonnal treaty.''' C. ALEXANDROWICZ, THE LAw-MAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE SPECIAUSED AGENCIES OF 
THE U.N. 55 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ALEXANDROWICZ). Article 22 outlines a "quasi-legislative" 
procedure in that a regulation comes into force for all members immediately upon passage and notice. 
Once the regulation has come into force, states can then contract out of their legal obligation if they so 
choose. [d. at 50-51. 
104. States would be free to enact statutes, regulations or any other appropriate measures to give 
effect to the Code. Draft International Code, supra note 64, at 3. The use of the word "bound" by the 
Director-General in his analysis of the legal implications of a regulation implies a higher degree of 
moral obligation. See note 108 and accompanying text infra. 
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C. Legal Effects of a Recommendation 
The WHA has the authority "to make recommendations to Members with 
respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization."105 According 
to the Director-General of the WHO, "[r]ecommendations of the Health Assem-
bly are not legally binding on Member States per se. "106 The WHO maintains, 
however, that "recommendations of the Health Assembly carry some moral or 
political weight, as they constitute the judgement of the collective membership of 
the Organization."107 The main difference between a regulation and a recom-
mendation is the extent to which each binds member states. lOS Rather than 
suggest that the member states adopt the Code of Breastmilk Substitutes in the 
form of a regulation, the Executive Board of the WHO proposed a draft which 
identified the proposal as a recommendation under Article 23 of the WHO 
Constitution. l09 The WHA adopted the Code of Breastmilk Substitutes as a 
recommendation llO and, therefore, the Code is not a legally binding agree-
ment. lll 
D. Reasons for Clwosing the Recommendation Form 
The adoption of the Code of Breastmilk Substitutes as a recommendation is 
consistent with the recent trend l12 away from the use of treaties and regulations 
and toward more flexible instruments designed to achieve basically the same 
goals.113 Recommendations avoid the "time consuming formal approval proce-
dure"114 of binding instruments. A country's law may require the approval of a 
national parliament before its representatives can sign a treaty or vote to adopt a 
105. CONSTITUTION, supra note 38, art. 23. 
106. Draft International Code, supra note 64, at 4. 
107. Id. 
108. Compare id. at 3 with id. at 4. The preamble to the draft in regulation form states: "THERE-
FORE: The Member States have agreed as follows .... " Id. at 7 (emphasis in original). In contrast, the 
preamble to the draft in recommendation form states: "THEREFORE: The Member States hereby 
agree the following articles which are recommended as a basis for action." Id. at 16 (emphasis in 
original). 
109. Thirty-Fourth World Health Assembly, Draft International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk 
Substitutes, Report by the Director-General, WHO Doc. A34/8 (67th Session of the Executive Board, 
December 10, 1980). 
110. Fifteenth Plenary Meeting, supra note 29, at 9; Code of Breastmilk Substitutes, supra note 8. 
Ill. See Draft International Code, supra note 64, at 4; Code of Breastmilk Substitutes, supra note 8, 
preamble. 
112. 1 D. LEIVE, INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY REGIMES 11 (1976) [hereinafter cited as LEIVE); 
ALEXANDROWICZ, supra note 103, at 55. 
113. LEIVE, supra note 112, at 11; ALEXANDROWICZ, supra note 103, at 55. 
114. LEIVE, supra note 112, at 11. 
19821 FORMULATING CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 391 
binding instrument such as a regulationYs Also, states appear to be more willing 
to accept nonbinding instruments.116 
In addition to the problems and obstacles of a formal process, political factors 
worked to influence the adoption of a non-binding recommendation. In the 
formula marketing case, Dr. Torbjon Mork of Norway, a member of the WHA 
Executive Board, noted that the Executive Board had decided to propose that 
governments adopt the Code in the form of a recommendation rather than in 
the more binding form of a WHO regulation in order to permit the Code's 
adoption without delay by consensus.117 Throughout the preliminary discussions 
on the draft codes, the United States had clearly maintained that it would not 
support a binding code. IIB Some sources claim that the WHA made the Code 
voluntary because of a U.S. request and because the United States had promised 
at one point in the negotiations that the American delegation to the WHA would 
not oppose the adoption of a voluntary code.119 Despite the objection of the 
United States to even voluntary guidelines, the WHA adopted the Code as a 
non-binding advisory instrument.12o 
V. How THE CODE OF BREASTMILK SUBSTITUTES MAY 
BECOME INTERNATIONAL LAw 
A. Introduction 
While compliance with the Code of Breastmilk Substitutes is completely volun-
tary at present, the Code provisions may later become legally binding.121 The 
general agreement reached within the WHA provides evidence of the political or 
115. Meijers, How is International Law Made1 The Stages of Growth of International Law and the Use of its 
Customary Rules, 9 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 3, 4 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Meijers]. 
116. Id. at 4-5. Nations see codes as less express political actions than treaties, "allowing unostenta-
tious acceptance." Id. at 4. LEIVE, supra note 112, at 11. 
117. N.Y. Times, May 21, 1981, at AIO, col. I. 
118. 127 CoNG. REc. H2947 (daily ed. June 16, 1981) (remarks of Rep. Pritchard). See note 34 and 
accompanying text supra. 
119. 127 CONG. REc. H2947 (daily ed.June 16, 1981) (remarks of Rep. Pritchard). The United States 
does not oppose all codes but it objects to the provisions of the Code of Breastmilk Substitutes. See 
Fourteenth Meeting,supra note 34, at 9 (statement of Gerald Helman, U.S. ambassador to the WHO). 
At the time of the behind-the-scenes negotiations concerning the Code, the U.S. delegation may not 
have known the exact provisions of the Code. 
120. Several members of Congress assert that U.S. opposition to the Code will seriously damage U.S. 
attempts to develop positive relationships with Third World nations. 127 CONGo REc. H2955 (daily ed. 
June 16, 1981) (remarks of Rep. Schneider). These Congressman feel that developing nations will see 
the United States as selfish and insensitive to their needs. 127 CONGo REc. E2528 (daily ed. May 21, 
1981) (remarks of Rep. Brodhead). 
121. See Davidow & Chiles, supra note 15. at 255. 
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moral commitments of member states122 which may have an effect on both states 
and TNCs. Although the Code is not legally enforceable at this time, parties to 
the instrument may still expect, and rely on, compliance by other parties to the 
Code.123 The Code itself suggests that individual countries should enact national 
legislation embodying the Code principles.124 National legislation based upon 
the Code provisions would make these recommendations legally binding on 
domestic producers as well as foreign producers selling formula within the 
nation. In addition, if nations engage in state practice in support of the Code 
provisions accompanied by the requisite opinio juris, the Code provisions may 
evolve into customary international law. 125 
B. Customary International Law 
Article 38( 1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice identifies 
several sources of international law, including international custom. 126 This 
Statute provides the "most authoritative statement"127 on the sources of interna-
tional law and expresses "the duty of any tribunal which is called upon to 
administer international law."128 Specifically, Article 38 provides: 
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with interna-
tional law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, estab-
lishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilised nations; 
d .... the judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law. 129 
This Statute sets forth a hierarchy of sources of internation law130 with treaties 
122. Draft International Code, supra note 64, at 4. See Davidow & Chiles, supra note 15, at 255; 
Schachter, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements, 71 AM.]. INT'L L. 296, 303 (1977) 
[hereinafter cited as Schachter]. 
123. Baade, supra note 5, at 38; Schachter, supra note 122, at 301. For example, a party to a 
non-binding agreement may be estopped from denying the legality of a course of conduct suggested by 
the agreement. /d. 
124. Code of Breastmilk Substitutes, supra note 8, art. II; see notes 104 & 108 and accompanying text 
supra. 
125. See North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of 
Germany/Netherlands) 1969 I.C.]. 3,41-45 (Judgment of February 20) where the International Court 
of Justice outlined the factors necessary for the formation of customary international law. 
126. Stat. I.C.]. art. 38(1). 
127. M. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAw 59 (1977). 
128. ]. BRIERLY, THE LAw OF NATIONS 56 (6th ed. 1963). 
129. Stat. I.C.]. art. 38( I). 
130. See generally Akehurst, The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 273 
(1974-1975). 
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and conventions comprising the upper level. Although the Code of Breastmilk 
Substitutes is neither a treatyl31 nor an international convention, nations may 
treat the Code as international custom and give it effect as international law. 
Article 38(l)(b) describes the creation of customary international law. Nations 
form customary international law as a result of a state practice which is a "general 
practice."132 State practice can include the physical acts as well as the declarations 
of individual states.133 The state practice is a "general practice" when the action 
taken is extensive and virtually uniform, at least among those states whose 
interests are specifically affected.134 In addition, this "general practice" must be 
"accepted as law,"135 i.e. the practice must occur "in such a way as to show a 
general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved."136 The 
nations engaging in the state practice must believe that their actions are legally 
required. 137 While customary international law is created in this manner, the 
process is not easily completed, as an examination of the components of custom-
ary international law will indicate. 
I. Definition of State Practice 
Article 38(l)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice establishes 
that a "general practice" of states is necessary to form customary international 
law. However, scholars disagree regarding the appropriate definition of state 
practice. According to the most restrictive view, only physical actsl38 constitute 
state action. 139 At the other extreme, one scholar asserts that almost any official 
statement is state practice. 140 
131. A treaty is an explicit agreement with an immediate binding effect on parties to the agreement. 
A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 104 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 
D'AMATO]; see also Draft International Code, supra note 64, at 4. 
132. Stat. I.C.]. art. 38(l)(b). 
133. Akehurst, supra note 19, at 10. Akehurst uses an inclusive definition of state practice. For a 
detailed discussion of several interpretations of state practice, see § V.B.i. infra. If the state action stems 
from a particular instrument, the instrument in question must "be of a fundamentally norm-creating 
character such as would be regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of law." North Sea 
Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.]. at 42. 
134. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.]. at 43. 
135. Stat. I.C.]. art. 38(1)(b). 
136. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.]. at 43. 
137. !d. at 44. 
138. A physical act is what a state does rather than what a state says. 
In most cases, a state's action is easily recognized. A state sends up an artificial satellite, tests 
nuclear weapons, receives ambassadors. levies customs duties, expels an alien, captures a 
private vessel, sets up a drilling rig in the continental shelf, visits and searches a neutral ship, 
and similarly engages in thousands of acts through its citizens and agents. 
D'AMATO, supra note 131, at 88. In contrast, claims and other statements by states are not physical acts 
and therefore, according to this view, they cannot constitute state practice. Id. 
139.Id. 
140. See M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 43-44 (1970). 
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Professor D'Amato expresses the restrictive view that only physical acts define 
state practice for the purpose of creating customary international law. 141 
D'Amato maintains that physical state acts are less likely to conflict with one 
another than are governmental claims and ·other official statements.142 He points 
out that a state can articulate many contradictory rules but it can only act in one 
way at one time: 
The act is concrete and usually unambiguous. Once the act takes 
place, the previously articulated rule that is consistent with the act 
takes on life as a rule of customary law, while the previously articu-
lated rules contrary to it remain in the realm of speculation. The 
state's act is visible, real, and significant; it crystalizes policy and 
demonstrates which of the many possible rules of law the acting state 
has decided to manifest. 143 
Dr. Thirlway holds a more moderate position that statements and claims of 
nations may constitute state action, but only if nations make statements in the 
context of a specific dispute or potential dispute.144 Therefore, "[t]he mere 
assertion in abstracto of the existence of a legal right or legal rule is not an act of 
State practice."145 Abstract statements can confirm state practice, but a state must 
intend that a statement will have an "immediate effect on a legal relationship" to 
create practice. 146 
A third view is that statements and declarations can constitute state action only 
when the pronouncements come from a source which is competent to make 
treaties in the name of the state.147 According to this approach, in determining 
whether state action exists, one would disregard all national laws and the prac-
tices of executive departments which lack the power to make treaties.148 This 
view is consistent with the theory that custom constitutes an implied agreement 
between states and therefore only those organs which are competent to make 
formal agreements in the name of the state should be able to make implied 
agreements. 149 
In contrast to these views of state practice, Professor Akehurst asserts that 
"[s]tate practice covers any act or statement by a State from which views can be 
141. D'AMATO, supra note 131, at 88. 
142. [d. 
143. [d. 




147. See Akehurst, supra note 19, at 8 where this theory is strongly supported by Strupp. 
148. Id. at 9. 
149. [d. at 8. 
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inferred about international law."15o Under this theory, state practice includes 
not only physical acts and statements but also 
other types of act or statement, such as standing or ad hoc instruc-
tions by a State to its officials, or criticisms by one State of the 
conduct of other States, or treaties (including treaties which have not 
entered into force). It can also include omissions and silence on the 
part of States. 151 
Rather than focusing on the source of the potential practice or the existence of 
an act, Akehurst takes the least restrictive position. He simply asks whether other 
nations can infer the state's view about customary law from the statement, act or 
omission.152 Although legal scholars do not agree on a single definition of state 
action, the majority appear to favor a less restrictive approach. 153 
Once nations engage in state practice, the frequency, length, prevalence, and 
consistency of the practice then become significant in determining whether a 
"general practice" exists. Most writers have expressed the view that while nations 
can establish state practice within a short period of time,154 these governments 
must repeat the action in a constant and uniform manner. 155 As the Interna-
tional Court of Justice has stated: 
Although the passage of only a short period of time is not necessar-
ily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary 
international law on the basis of what was originally a purely 
conventional rule, an indispensable requirement would be that 
within the period in question, short though it might be, State prac-
tice, including that of States whose interests are specially affected, 
should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense 
of the provision invoked; - and should moreover have occurred in 
such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule oflaw or legal 
obligation is involved. 156 
150. [d. at 10. 
151. [d. 
152. [d. at 53. 
153. See id. at 2. 
154. !d. at 15; South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), 1966 I.C.]. 4, 
291 (judgment of July 18) (dissent, Tanaka). 
155. Meijers, supra note 115, at 13; South West Africa, 1966 I.e.]. at 292 (dissent, Tanaka). Dr. 
Akehurst suggests that 
a rule of customary law is established ifit is accepted by the international community, and that 
the number of states taking part in a practice is a more important criterion of acceptance than 
the number of acts of which the practice is composed, and a much more important criterion 
than the duration of the practice. 
Akehurst, supra note 19, at 16. 
156. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.e.]. at 43. 
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Therefore, the length, repetitIOn and consistency of the action are important 
indicators of general consent to the practice by the international community. 
The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases l57 suggest that the number of states and 
their respective degree of interest in the controversy are also important factors in 
determining whether international consensus exists. 158 The Court stated that a 
"very widespread and representative participation ... includ[ing] that of States 
whose interests were specially affected"159 is required. In an earlier case in which 
the International Court of Justice interpreted Article 38(l)(b), Judge Tanaka 
asserted that the consent of all states is not required for the creation of custom-
ary law: 160 
[T]he Statute does not exclude the possibility of a few dissidents for 
the purpose of the creation of a customary international law and that 
the contrary view of a particular State or States would result in the 
permission of obstruction by veto, which could not have been ex-
pected by the legislator who drafted the said Article. 161 
Judges, however, do not agree on whether unanimity is required162 or if not, on 
the minimum number of states required to participate in a practice in order for it 
to constitute general practice. 163 Professor Akehurst suggests that "[t]he number 
of States needed to create a rule of customary law varies according to the amount 
of practice which conflicts with the rule."164 A large number of states must 
engage in the practice only if substantial conflicting practice exists. 165 
Professor Meijers, while advocating a similar approach, focuses on the pur-
pose of the regulation.166 Meijers notes that "[a] state will want to accept the 
binding force of a rule of law only if the other states which are necessary for the 
practical and effective application of the rule are prepared to accept the same 
obligation."167 Regardless of the criteria used to determine whether a sufficient 
number of states have participated in a practice, the states who participate in the 
creation of the rule must be those "whose interests [are] specially affected."168 
The question of how many and which affected states must participate in the rule 
formation remains unresolved.169 
157. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. 3. 
158. [d. at 43. 
159. [d. at 42. 
160. South West Africa, 1966 I.C.]. at 291 (dissent, Tanaka). 
161. [d. 
162. See Akehurst, supra note 19, at 17, 26. 
163. Compare South West Africa, 1966 I.C.]. at 291 (dissent, Tanaka) with North Sea Continental 
Shelf, 1969 I.C.]. at 130 (Ammoun). 
164. Akehurst, supra note 19, at 18. 
165. [d. 
166. Meijers, supra note 115, at 7. 
167. [d. 
168. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 43. 
169. See Akehurst, supra note 19, at 18-19. 
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2. Opinio Juris (Accepted as Law) 
In the creation of customary international law, the initial requirements are the 
existence of sufficient state practice '70 and a rule suitable for evolution into 
customary international law .171 These factors alone, however, are not enough to 
create customary international laW. 172 Article 38(l)(b) also requires that the 
"general practice" of the state be "accepted as law" "opinio juris" I 73 by that state. 
The International Court of Justice has traditionally interpreted "accepted as 
law" to mean: 
Not only must the acts concerned amount to settled practice, but 
they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be 
evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the 
existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e., 
the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of 
the opinio juris sive necessitatis. 174 The States concerned must t here-
fore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obliga-
tion. '75 
A radical approach to this traditional requirement is to deny any requirement.of 
opinio juris. 176 However, while many cases do not mention opinio juris, no case 
expressly holds that opinio juris is unnecessary.l77 Commentators still assert that 
opinio juris is necesary for the creation of customary law and have formulated 
some variations on the traditional definition of opinio juris. 178 Akehurst criticizes 
the traditional definition of opinio juris for its paradoxical nature.l79 The defini-
tion "seems to require that States must believe that something is already law 
before it can become law."'8o While Akehurst recognizes that the formation of 
customary international law requires opinio juris, he asserts that a statement that 
170. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.]. at 43. 
171. [d. at 41-42. 
172. Akehurst, supra note 19, at 31. 
173. Stat. I.C.]. art. 38( I)(b). 
174. "Opinio juris sive necessitatis" is translated as "understanding of the law or of necessity." See 
CASSELL'S LATIN DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1968). 
175. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.e.]. at 44. 
176. Akehurst, supra note 19, at 32. 
177. [d. 
178. Thirlway asserts that "the requirement of opinio juris is equivalent merely to the need for the 
practice in question to have been accompanied by either a sense of conforming with the law, or the view 
that the ptactice was potentially law, as suited to the needs of the international community." THIRLWAY, 
supra note 144, at 53-54. Instead of accepting the traditional definition of opinio juris D'Amato substi-
tutes a requirement that the practice be accompanied by articulation. "The articulation of a rule of 
international law ... in advance of or concurrently with a positive act (or omission) of a state gives a 
state notice that its action or decision will have legal implications." D'AMATO, supra note 131, at 75. For a 
discussion of these various definitions, see Akehurst, supra note 19, at 34-42. 
179. Akehurst, supra note 19, at 31-32. 
180. [d. at 32 (emphasis in original). 
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the state practice is "permitted, required or forbidden by international law" 
satisfies the requirement of opinio juris. 181 
3. Codes as Customary International Law 
With sufficient state practice and opinio juris, the provIsIOns of a code of 
conduct could become customary international law. 182 However, two common 
features of codes - their provisions regulating TNCSl83 and their non-binding 
form - cause their evolution into customary international law to be more 
difficult. 184 While a code may have provisions directed at TNCs, and TNCs may, 
in fact, act in compliance with these provisions, the behavior of TNCs cannot 
contribute to the formation of customary international law .185 The evolution into 
customary international law requires state practice. 186 TNCs are neither "state 
nor public international organizations."187 Since TNCs are non-state entities, 
their actions and pronouncements cannot qualify as state practice or provide the 
necessary element of opinio juris. 188 
In addition, nations may approve a code only in a non-binding form; a code 
may state specifically that it is "voluntary and not legally enforceable"189 or the 
code may be non-binding in form.19o One position is that a non-binding volun-
tary code shields TNCs from domestic or international enforcement.191 On the 
other hand, even if nations display state practice in compliance with the code 
provisions, the voluntary nature of a code would make the requirement of opinio 
juris more difficult. 192 A state would be less likely to believe that its actions were 
conforming to a legal obligation as is required by opinio juris. Nevertheless, 
Professor Baade continues to assert that despite the voluntary nature of a code, 
the code provisions may evolve into customary international lawl93 and, there-
fore, the provisions may apply even to TNCs and nations which have never 
accepted the code provisions. 194 Two common characteristics of codes which 
181. Id. at 53. 
182. Baade, supra note 5, at 15, 22-23. 
183. See Code of Breastmilk Substitutes, supra note 8; OECD DECLARATION, supra note 8. 
184. Baade, supra note 5, at 16-17. 
185. Id. 
186. See generally Baade, Individual Responsibility, in 4 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
ORDER: THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 290-327 (C. BLACK & R. FALK eds. 1972). 
187. Baade, supra note 5, at 16. 
188. /d. at 16-17. 
189. See OECD DECLARATION, supra note 8, at 970. 
190. See Code of Breastmilk Substitutes, supra note 8, which the WHA approved in the form of a 
non-binding recommendation. 
191. This position is that since a code is designated as "'voluntary and non legally enforceable," the 
code provisions cannot gain a legal status. See Baade, supra note 5, at 30. For a discussion of the shield 
theory as applied to the OECD Declaration, see id. 
192. /d. at 23. 
193. Id. at 18. 
194. If code provisions evolve into customary international law, they would bind even those nations 
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contribute to their movement into international law include their statements of 
official policy and their recommendations of follow-up procedures. 195 These 
follow-up procedures involve home and/or host countries to insure that the code 
provisions are more effective. This type of participation by states could represent 
a form of state practice as states may enact legislation or institute policies in 
compliance with the code provisions. 196 These actions and their accompanying 
statements should indicate whether the nation views its actions as legally re-
quired. 197 This state practice combined with the requisite opinio juris could 
constitute the formation of customary internationallaw.198 
Several scholars assert that emphasis on the formal legal nature of codes is 
misplaced. 199 They contend that rather than focusing on whether codes are 
voluntary or binding, the emphasis should be on recognizing codes as multilat-
eral declarations of policy on matters of international concern. 200 Codes are 
serious, formal pronouncements of policy.20I Such multilateral agreements pro-
vide evidence of the "international consensus which lies behind the instrument 
and the concomitant respect that concerned actors would accord it as a legal 
norm; an agreement need not be binding to be recognized as an authoritative 
guide to behavior."zoz A code's non-legal and non-binding status does not neces-
sarily affect its operation.203 Parties to a code may still expect and rely on 
compliance and the instrument may have legal implications.204 
C. Case Study of the Code of Breastmilk Substitutes - Its Place in International Law 
Despite the fact that the WHA approved the WHO "International Code of 
Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes" as a non-binding recommendation, the 
Code may not remain voluntary for long. The adoption of the Code by an 
overwhelming majority of the WHA demonstrates a consensus within this group 
regarding the importance of breastfeeding, and the concomitant need to restrict 
the marketing of breastmilk substitutes.205 At present, the Code is important 
which did not expressly consent to these provisions. A state can avoid being bound by clearly objecting 
to the formation and application of the code. See Davidow & Chiles. supra note 15. at 255. 
195. Baade. sUfrra note 5. at 19-20. 
196. [d. at 19-20, 39, 49. 
197. See Akehurst, supra note 19, at 36-37. 
198. See North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.]. at 41. 
199. See Davidow & Chiles, sufrra note 15, at 255; Coonrod, sufrra note I, at 297. 
200. See Davidow & Chiles, sUfrra note 15, at 255; Coonrod. sufrra note I, at 297. 
20 I. Baade, supra note 5, at 19. 
202. Coonrod, supra note I, at 297. 
203. Falk, On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 782, 783-85 
(1966); Schachter, sUfrra note 122, at 299-301. See notes 122-23 and acwmpanying text sufrra. 
204. Schachter, sUfrra note 122, at 299-301. See notes 122-23 and accompanying text sufrra. 
205. That a consensus exists within the WHA on the infant formula issue is a reasonable conclusion, 
as the Code's central theme is the superiority of breastfeeding. See Code of Breastmilk Substitutes, sUfrra 
note 8, preamble. The WHA approved this Code by a vote of one hundred and eighteen nations to one. 
Fifteenth Plenary Meeting, supra note 33, at 9. 
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because its principles may have moral and practical force on both states and 
business enterprises.206 For example, the Code may influence some corporations 
to develop their own codes restricting marketing practices and may encourage 
other producers to improve upon existing marketing guidelines.207 In addition, 
"the understanding and expectation [of the WHA] ... is that states will modify 
their practices to conform to the understandings of the agreement."208 Article 11 
of the Code specifically suggests that governments take appropriate steps to 
implement the Code, including the adoption of legislation and regulations.209 If 
individual nations do adopt the Code provisions, such national legislation would 
govern formula producers operating in these particular countries.210 In this way 
national legislation would give these originally non-binding provisions the force 
of law. 
More importantly, the Code could be a significant initial step in the creation of 
customary international law. Sufficient state practice accompanied by opinio juris 
is still necessary for the evolution of the Code provisions into customary interna-
tional law. 211 Using a broad definition of state practice,212 the adoption of the 
Code by the WHA could be one of the first examples of state practice213 with 
respect to the Code provisions. 
Individual government legislation or regulations adopted in compliance with 
Article 11 of the Code of Breastmilk Substitutes, as well as future collective 
endorsements of the Code by the member states of the WHA, could also consti-
tute state action.214 In contrast, adherence to or adoption of Code provisions by 
members of the infant formula industry has no direct significance regarding the 
206. See notes 122-23 and accompanying text supra. See N.Y. Times, May 21, 1981, at A9, col. I. 
207. "[TJhe baby food industry pioneered the notion of marketing codes, although, admittedly, their 
purpose was to forestall external regulation rather than find guidelines that would effectively protect 
babies and mothers from inappropriate commercial pressures. As industry's own codes were shown 
defective in both design and execution, public protest escalated." 1981 Hearings, supra note 86, at 96 
(statement of Leah Margulies, Co-Director, Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR». 
N ow that the WHA has adopted the Code of Breastmilk Substitutes, formula company representatives 
have become active in proposing their own codes and working with government to propose legislation 
relating to formula marketing. Jd. at 97-98. However, industry lobbyists encourage the adoption of 
legislation that is much weaker than the Code of Breastmilk Substitutes. 1d. 
208. Davidow & Chiles, supra note 15, at 255. 
209. Code of Breastmilk Substitutes, supra note 8, art. II. 
210. See Davidow & Chiles, supra note 15, at 256. 
211. See § V infra. 
212. This definition includes "any act or statement by a State from which views can be inferred about 
international law." Akehurst, supra note 19, at 10. 
213. See South West Africa, 1966 I.C.]. at 291-92 (dissent, Tanaka). Judge Tanaka stated that "the 
accumulation of authoritative pronouncements such as resolutions, declarations. decisions. . . can be 
characterized as evidence of the international custom referred to in Article 38, paragraph I(b)." 1d. at 
292. Statements made by government officials in support of the Code could also qualify as state practice 
using Akehurst's definition. See Akehurst, supra note 19, at 10. 
214. See Akehurst, supra note 19, at 10. 
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formation of customary international law, as private industry is a nonstate 
actor.215 
The state action must be repeated, consistent and exhibited by a sufficient 
number of states in order to constitute customary internationallaw.216 Because 
scholars and judges view the repetition of state action as the central factor in 
determining general practice,217 the frequency and the manner in which various 
nations exhibit their support of the Code of Breastmilk Substitutes should be 
significant. If states exhibited this type of general practice with the requisite 
opinio juris, thus making the Code provisions customary international law, the 
provisions could bind even those states that did not expressly consent to the 
Code provisions.218 
D. Significance of the U.S. Vote 
While the United States was the only nation to object to the WHO Code,219 this 
one vote could have significant effects. Conflicting practice, such as the U.S. vote 
against the Code and statements by U.S. officials that the United States views the 
Code as purely voluntary, increases the amount of state practice by other nations 
that is necessary to create a rule of customary law.220 The Code could affect the 
interests of the United States as three major international formula producers221 
are U.S. corporations.222 Without the support of this "specially affected" nation, 
the evolution of the Code into customary international law may be much more 
difficult. 223 
Finally, the United States is a major power with worldwide interests, which 
maintains embassies in many other nations and which has many opportunities to 
contribute to the development of international rules. Therefore, U.S. actions 
may receive more publicity than do the actions of smaller states and smaller 
states may be more likely to imitate the United States. Therefore, the U.S. 
position against the Code has the potential to affect the actions of other na-
tions.224 In spite of this, however, Akehurst points out that the occurrence of 
imitation is uncertain and only "the presence or absence of imitation ... affects 
215. See notes 185-88 and accompanying text supra. 
216. See North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.]. at 42-43; see also notes 154-59 and accompanying 
text supra. 
217. See note 155 and accompanying text supra. 
218. Davidow & Chiles, supra note 15, at 255. See note 194 and accompanying text supra. 
219. See Fifteenth Plenary Meeting, supra note 33, at 9. 
220. Akehurst, supra note 19, at 18. 
221. The three major American corporations which market formula on an international scale 
include Mead Johnson, Ross and Wyeth Laboratories. See N.Y. Times, May 22,1981, § IV, at I, col. 3. 
222. For a discussion of the importance of state practice by nations whose interests are "specially 
affected," see notes 157-59 and accompanying text supra. 
223. /d. See Akehurst, supra note 19, at 23. 
224. See Akehurst, supra note 19, at 23. 
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the future development of customary law, not the fact that the original actions 
were taken by a great power."225 U.S. officials have made several strong state-
ments against the use of a code to govern worldwide marketing;226 the United 
States objected during the formation of the Code, and if the United States 
continues to object to the Code's application, the United States would not be 
bound by the Code principles or directives. 227 In addition, imitation of this U.S. 
action by other nations would hamper the Code's evolution into customary 
international law.228 
E. Analysis 
Upon passage, the Code of Breastmilk Substitutes is an expression of the 
consensus within the WHA on the importance of breastfeeding and the need to 
restrict formula marketing techniques. 229 The Code is not legally binding on 
member states230 and it could remain in this non-binding form. Nevertheless, as 
an expression of political and moral commitments, the Code may have an effect 
on states and TNCs.231 
The Code provisions could have an even greater im pact if they were to become 
legally binding within the international community. The Code provisions could 
become customary international law if the requisite events occur. Not only must 
state practice occur that is consistent, repeated and widespread,232 but this 
general practice must be accompanied by opinio juris. 233 "Specially affected"234 
states must participate in the practice. Objections by specially affected states, 
such as the United States in the present case, heightens the requirements of 
general practice. The International Court of Justice notes that this process 
"constitutes indeed one of the recognized methods by which new rules of cus-
225. [d. 
226. For example, U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Resources Richard Schweiker explained that 
"[t]he administration honestly does not believe the WHO should be an international Federal Trade 
Commission." A U.S. Vote On Baby Formula that Stirred a Storm, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REp.,June I, 1981, at 
60. In voting against the Code at the WHA, U.S. Delegate Gerald Helman took the position that: 
the apparent flexibility provided to governments ... did not. . . overcome the overall effect 
of prescribing a rigid set of rules applicable to companies, health workers, and health care 
systems in all parts of the world. The Code also contained provisions that caused serious legal 
and constitutional problems for his country. Moreover, the United States was seriously con-
cerned about WHO's involvement in commercial codes, and that was the central basis for its 
inability to support the Code. 
Fourteenth Meeting, supra note 34, at 9. 
227. See note 194 and accompanying text supra. 
228. See Akehurst, supra note 19, at 23. 
229. See note 122 and accompanying text supra. 
230. See notes lID-II and accompanying text supra. 
231. See notes 123-25 and accompanying text supra. 
232. See notes 154-56 and accompanying text supra. 
233. See § V.B.2 supra. 
234. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.]. at 42. 
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tomary international law may be formed. At the same time this result IS not 
lightly to be regarded as having been attained."235 
VI. CONCLUSION 
While the provisions of the WHO Code have the potential to evolve to the level 
of customary international law, presently one can only speculate as to whether 
the Code will establish a precedent of worldwide consensus and concern regard-
ing the important role of breastfeeding and the need to regulate the marketing 
practices of the producers of breastmilk substitutes. Nevertheless, the Code is 
not "instant international law." Only future actions taken by nations in accor-
dance with the Code will provide the legal basis necessary to give effect to the 
Code principles. Such actions by individual nations must take the form of 
national legislation or regulations similar to the directives in the Code. The 
adoption of national legislation based on the Code will not only restrict market-
ing practices within certain countries, but will also provide the evidence of state 
action required for the creation of customary international law. Domestic en-
forcement of the Code principles or the Code's evolution into international law 
will affect TNCs despite the fact that nations approved the Code as a voluntary 
instrument. The Code provisions are not voluntary for TNCs simply because 
nations adopted the Code as a voluntary instrument.236 Of greater importance 
than the voluntary nature of the Code is the international respect for it as a legal 
norm. The consensus and respect for its legal nature legitimize the Code's 
transformation into international law .2:37 If and when the transformation occurs, 
the role of both the WHO, in its regulation of the behavior of TNCs, and of 
future codes of conduct, in general, will be stronger. 
Karen C. Del Ponte 
235. /d. at 41. 
236. See note 194 and accompanying text supra. 
237. See notes 200·204 and accompanying text supra. 
